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THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE OLD ACADEMY 
ABSTRACT: The task of identifying the particular epistemological theories of the members of 
the old Academy is not an easy one, by reason of the general lack of evidence, but, at least in 
the case of Speusippus and Xenocrates, some insights are derivable. In both cases what we 
can observe is – while doubtless acknowledging the inferior status of sense-perception – a 
concern, in the case of Speusippus, to arrive at a criterion of accuracy in the perception of 
sense objects, namely by applying logos to raw sense-data, thus achieving epistemonike 
aisthesis; and in the case of Xenocrates, the application of his theory of minimal parts to the 
elucidation of the process of aisthesis. 
SOMMARIO: Il compito di ricostruire le specifiche teorie epistemologiche dei membri 
dell’Academia antica non è facile per via della generale mancanza di testimonianze in merito. 
Almeno nel caso di Speusippo e di Senocrate alcuni punti sono fortunatamente 
identificabili. Quanto si può osservare in ambedue i casi – ferma restando l’indubbia 
inferiorità della sensazione – è la preoccupazione, in Speusippo, di rintracciare un criterio di 
accuratezza nella percezione degli oggetti sensibili, applicando il logos ai meri dati percettivi, 
pervenendo così a una epistemonike aisthesis; in Senocrate, invece, si riscontra l’applicazione 
della sua teoria delle parti minime alla chiarificazione del processo dell’aisthesis.  
KEYWORDS: Academy; Sense-perception; Epistemonike aesthesis; Logos; Atomic Minima 
Among the basic tenets of philosophy inherited from Plato by his immediate 
successors in the Old Academy, as would be generally agreed, are a relative 
contempt for reliability of sense-perception and the acceptance of a theory of 
transcendent Forms. Neither of these doctrines, however, especially the 
latter, are to be regarded as handed down on tablets of stone, or indeed as 
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having attained any very definite form; rather, they were in the nature of 
‘working hypotheses’, open to modification and development in various 
directions. 
As we know, the views put forth by Socrates and other spokesmen of 
Plato on the value and reliability of the senses and the data they provide are 
generally rather negative, though not universally so. If we focus, for example, 
on the Phaedo, we find, at 65b-67a, the view expressed by Socrates (who is, 
admittedly, facing his own imminent death) that the senses are never reliable, 
and that, if one is ever to acquire true knowledge, it will only be by escaping 
the body and its organs of sense; while, in the Republic, Socrates is not much 
more positive: at V, 476a-c, those characterized dismissively as “lovers of 
sights and sounds (philotheamones, philekooi)” – that is to say, those who 
hold that sense-objects are the only reality – are declared to be “living in a 
dream state (oneirottein)”. 
In the Timaeus, on the other hand, Timaeus tells his interlocutors, 
including Socrates (47a-c), that the capacity for vision in humans is the cause 
of their ability to understand the workings of the physical universe, which 
leads them to a taste for philosophy, and that will in turn stimulate them to a 
true understanding of the hidden structure of things. 
But we are not really faced here by any stark contradiction or change of 
heart on the part of Plato. If we work back, so to speak, from this Timaeus 
passage to the previous two ‘negative’ passages, we may discern, first, that, in 
the Phaedo, at 75ab, it is by the intelligent observation of nearly equal sticks 
and other objects that one can arrive at an intuition of Equality Itself; and 
that in the Republic passage, it is admitted (475d) that the philotheamones, 
while not being philosophers, “bear a certain likeness to philosophers”, by 
reason of their “delight in learning”. So the senses, if employed with 
discrimination and intelligence, can after all yield insights into reality. 
In this connection, we may adduce also the evidence of the Theaetetus, 
centrally concerned as it is with the relation between sense-perception and 
knowledge. The description by Socrates, near the beginning of his elenchos of 
Theaetetus, of the ‘secret doctrine’ of Protagoras (156a-157c) is rather too 
suffused with Socratic irony to be regarded as anything like a straight 
Platonic theory of perception. But Socrates’ interrogation of Theaetetus at 
184b-186e, where an important distinction is made between the data 
received by – or rather through (dia, 184c 8) – the individual senses, and the 
unifying and generalizing power which unites and structures these data, 
which Theaetetus identifies as the soul (psyche, 185e 1), seems to provide an 
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excellent background for the theories of perception arising in the Old 
Academy. 
It is against such a background, then, that the doctrinal positions of the 
members of the Old Academy may be viewed. In this regard, one must 
emphasise at the outset the sad dearth of reliable evidence for all the main 
figures concerned, specifically, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemon. 
However, by the close analysis of such data as have come down to us, we may 
nonetheless, I think, derive some worthwhile conclusions. 
I will begin with a report from Sextus Empiricus (M, VII, 145-146)1 
relaying Speusippus’ doctrine of the ‘criterion of truth’ (kriterion tes 
aletheias), or ‘guiding principle of knowledge’:2  
Speusippus’ view was that, since there are things which are sense-perceptible and others 
which are intelligible, of those that are intelligible the criterion is cognitive reason 
(epistemonikos logos), while of sensible things it is cognitive sense-perception 
(epistemonike aisthesis). And cognitive sense-perception he conceived to be that which 
participates in the truth which accords with reason. To take an example: the fingers of 
the flute-player or harper possess an artistic activity (technike energeia), which is, 
however, not brought to fruition primarily (proegoumenos) through the fingers 
themselves, but is fully developed as a result of training under the co-operative 
guidance of reasoning (logismos), and the sense-perception of the musician, while it 
possesses an activity capable of grasping the harmonious and the non-harmonious, 
nevertheless is not self-produced (autophyes), but is acquired by reason. Even so, 
cognitive sense-perception naturally derives from reason the cognitive experience 
which it shares, and which leads to the unerring discrimination (aplanes diagnosis) of 
its proper objects (hypokeimena). (transl. Bury, slightly emended) 
We need to consider carefully the theory being developed here, particularly 
the status being accorded the rational cognition of the physical world. If we 
think of the hands of the skilled pianist, for example, flashing across the keys 
of the piano, we can discern, on the one hand, a purely physical facility in the 
fingers, built up by long periods of fairly mechanical practice, which is 
certainly necessary for the skill of the pianist to be realized, and this would 
presumably answer to the basic physical efficiency of the sense-organs in 
receiving their proper objects. But on the other hand, what makes the 
                                                            
1 F75 (= 34 Isnardi Parente) in the collection of L. Tarán, Speusippus of Athens. A 
Critical Study with a Collection of the Related Texts and Commentary, Leiden, Brill, 1981. 
2 The formulation ‘criterion of truth’ is a formulation that does not seem to go 
further back than the Stoics; there is no other evidence for its employment by either Old 
Academics or Aristotelians. I have suggested elsewhere (J. Dillon, The Heirs of Plato, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2003, p. 77) that Sextus’ source here is probably Antiochus of 
Ascalon, in his Kanonika. 
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movement of the fingers purposeful and truly artistic is the intellectual power 
of the pianist, directing them in obedience to his or her conception of the 
form of the composition. Even so, our perception of the physical world, our 
discernment and identification of objects (pragmata), groups of objects, and 
situations within it, is a function, not of ‘raw’ aisthesis, but rather of logos 
directing aisthesis – that is to say, epistemonike aisthesis. 
One may note, in this connection, that the mention of aplanes diagnosis 
in the passage of Sextus, if we can reasonably attribute it to Speusippus 
himself, may be a covert reference to the ‘Circle of the Other’ in the soul, as 
set out by Plato at Tim., 37b-c, which, when “moving in a straight course”, 
causes “opinions and beliefs which are firm and true”. 
Speusippus, then, has plainly drawn creative conclusions from his 
Platonic heritage, and has in the process significantly upgraded the status of 
sense-perception – or at least some sense-perceptions, viz. those reinforced 
by informed, ‘scientific’ expertise.3 We may note,4 however, that Plato 
himself is quite prepared on occasion to acknowledge expertise in the 
recognition of harmonious sounds on the part of musicians (Soph., 253b; 
Phlb., 17b-e); and the need for expert sense-perception on the part of the 
good doctor is adduced at Phdr., 268b – in either case this being the result of 
the ability to apply a rational understanding of harmony derived from the 
intelligible realm to appropriate sensible phenomena. So really, Speusippus 
might be viewed as merely formalizing various suggestive propositions put 
forth by his distinguished uncle. 
As regards his formulation of the criterion for the knowledge of 
intelligible objects, it is important to realize that these will not be the 
Platonic Forms in anything like their traditional guise (if only we could be 
sure what that was!), as we have the – admittedly somewhat tendentious – 
evidence of Aristotle (Metaph., M, 9, 1085b 36 ff. = F35 Tarán = 77 Isnardi 
Parente) that Speusippus, recognising the difficulties attendant on the 
theory of Forms, had rejected these in favour of a system of numbers, and 
                                                            
3 I would not go so far as Tarán, Speusippus of Athens, p. 434-435, in concluding that Speusippus is 
upgrading the status of all sense-perception; he is surely making a clear distinction here between that 
which is informed by logos and that which is not. 
4 I am indebted here to the acute observations of G. Cambiano, in his most useful paper “Speusippo 
e la percezione scientifica”, Antiquorum Philosophia, 5, 2011, p. 99-117. See also the useful discussions of M. 
Isnardi Parente, “Speusippo in Sesto Empirico, Adv. Math. VII, 145-146”, La Parola del Passato, 24, 1969, 
p. 203-214, Ead., “Sesto, Platone, l’Accademia antica e i Pitagorici”, Elenchos, 13, 1992, p. 119-167 
(http://scholarlysource.daphnet.org/index.php/DDL/article/view/126/65 [08.11.2018]) and Aldo 
Brancacci’s article in this special issue.  
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secondarily of geometrical figures. These, as I have conjectured elsewhere,5 
when projected on the level of the World Soul, do the work of Forms in 
giving structure to the physical world, but they are themselves more in the 
nature of mathematical formulae. It is, I would suggest, the discernment of 
the mathematical or geometrical nature of this structure in its various 
manifestations (such as harmonies and proportions) that, for Speusippus, 
constitutes epistemonike aisthesis. 
What, then, of his successor Xenocrates? I see no reason to doubt that 
he would have endorsed a theory of perception very similar to that of 
Speusippus, but, sadly, we have no evidence on this subject. What we are told 
about, in a passage of Sextus immediately following the account of 
Speusippus quoted above (M, VII, 147), is actually a distinctive tripartite 
division of levels of cognition, corresponding to a system of three levels of 
reality (which is quite a feature of Xenocrates’ metaphysics): 
Xenocrates says that there are three forms of existence (ousia), the sensible (aisthete), 
the intelligible (noete), and that which is composite [scil. of these two] and the object of 
opinion (doxaste); and of these the sensible is that which exists below the heaven, the 
intelligible is that which belongs to all things outside the heaven, and the opinable and 
composite is that of the heaven itself; for it is visible by sense-perception, but 
intelligible by means of astronomy. This, then, being the situation, he declared that the 
criterion of the existence which is outside the heavens and intelligible is scientific 
knowledge (episteme), that of what is below the heavens and sensible is sense-
perception (aisthesis), and the criterion of the mixed existence is opinion (doxa). 
(transl. Bury, slightly emended) 
It seems to have been one of Xenocrates’ particular concerns to find a 
formula, or formulae, for linking the various levels of the universe with each 
other, and to employ the device of postulating an intermediate stage between 
the two extremes of intelligible (and unchanging) and sensible (and ever-
changing) reality in order to facilitate this. Here we see him presenting 
episteme and aisthesis as two contrasting modes of cognition of two opposed 
modes of being. So much is Platonic enough; his interesting innovation, 
however, is borrow the Platonic concept of ‘opinion’ (doxa) to characterize 
the apprehension of the intermediate, heavenly realm, on the ground that its 
contents, the planets and stars, are perceptible (though unreliably) by the 
sense of sight, but their true nature is cognizable only intellectually, by means 
of astronomy – that is to say, scientific astronomy, as outlined in Plato’s 
                                                            
5 Dillon, The Heirs of Plato, p. 48-49. 
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Republic (VII, 528e ff.) – and is thus to be regarded as a mixture of the other 
two modes of apprehension. 
Although Xenocrates is not primarily concerned with theories of sense-
perception in the present context, it seems reasonable to draw the conclusion 
that, if cognition of the heavenly bodies requires the application of doxa, to a 
major extent, to supplement aisthesis, in order to grasp their essence, then 
this might also be true, at least to a minor extent, to grasp the essence of 
ordinary sublunar physical objects – that is, to achieve epistemonike aisthesis 
of them.6 It is a sad reflection, however, of the miserable state of our 
knowledge, that we actually know nothing of the views of Xenocrates on 
sense-perception. 
Another interesting doctrine of his, however, may in fact prove relevant 
to this topic. We are told by the doxographer Aetius7 that “Xenocrates and 
Diodorus8 defined the smallest elements [of things] as partless” (i.e. declared 
that there were minimal parts of things), and that “Empedocles and 
Xenocrates compose the elements of smaller particles (ogkoi), which are 
minima (elachista) and, as it were, elements of elements” (my own 
translations). Xenocrates is here placed in rather peculiar company, but in 
his case, this ‘atomistic’ theory may be essentially a creative development of 
the theory of basic triangles, which form the building blocks of the elements, 
and so of everything else, in Plato’s Timaeus. 
This theory by itself, admittedly, need not have any direct relevance to a 
theory of sense-perception, but a further aspect of it, reported this time by 
Porphyry, in his commentary on the Harmonics of Ptolemy,9 seems to me to 
                                                            
6 This situating of doxa between episteme and aisthesis seems to constitute an 
interesting variation on Plato’s well-known situating of doxa between episteme and agnoia, 
at the end of Republic V (477c-480a) – though we cannot be sure that Xenocrates is 
intending to criticize that passage! 
7 I, 13, 3, p. 312b Diels (= Xenocrates Fr. 51 Heinze/F68 Isnardi Parente2), and I, 
17, 3, p. 315b Diels (= Fr. 50 Heinze/F71 Isnardi Parente2). 
8 That is to say, Diodorus Cronus, the dialectician of the Megarian School. On this 
topic, and on the interesting question of the influence of their atomistic theories on that 
of Epicurus later, see the most useful contributions of F. Verde, Elachista: La dottrina dei 
minimi nell’Epicureismo, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 2013, Ch. 2 and Id., “Diodorus 
Cronus on Perceptible Minima”, in U. Zilioli (ed.), From the Socratics to the Socratic 
Schools: Classical Ethics, Metaphysics and Epistemology, London-New York, Routledge, 
2015, p. 134-148. 
9 In Ptol. Harm. p. 30, 1 ff. Düring (= Fr. 9 Heinze/F6 Isnardi Parente2). Porphyry’s 
primary authority here is declared to be a certain Heraclides (possibly Heraclides of 
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do so. This is his theory of sound and harmony, in which he sets out, first, 
an analysis of types of motion (kinesis), and then, when he has identified 
sound as a species of motion in a straight line (eis euthy), presents it as 
consisting in fact of a sequence of sound-atoms, each occurring at a given 
instant, but giving the impression of a continuous flow. To illustrate this 
conception, he offers the analogy of a spinning top with a single black or 
white spot on its surface, which, as the top spins, appears as a continuous 
line – and likewise, a single vertical line painted on the surface will appear 
as a solid plane of colour. 
What we may presumably derive from this is the suggestion that not 
only sounds, but also visual data, may be analysed into atomic units, which 
then appear to our senses as continuous flows of auditory or visual 
phenomena, since our senses are not acute enough to discern the single units 
as they strike upon them. 
These observations are, admittedly, presented incidentally to an 
exposition of the ‘Pythagorean’ theory of harmony, but there seems no 
reason not to take them as forming part of a serious theory of perception. 
One may grant that our sense-organs are not acute enough to perceive the 
atomic units of which our sense-data are composed, but on the other hand, it 
may be claimed that our faculty of sense-perception is capable of imposing 
coherent form on these ‘raw’ sense-data. In any case, one may observe here, as 
in the case of Speusippus, a greater degree of attention being paid to the 
mechanics of our perception of the physical world than is evident in the 
dialogues of Plato. 
The rather maverick member of the Old Academy, Heraclides of 
Pontus, also seems to have postulated atomistic ‘unarticulated particles’ 
(anarmoi ogkoi) as the basic building-blocks out of which all sense-
perceptible entities are compounded (Fr. 118 Wehrli = 59 Schütrumpf), 
which puts him in the same camp as Xenocrates on this issue. That he also 
drew conclusions about the nature of sense-perception from this theory is 
indicated by a doxographic snippet from Stobaeus (= Fr. 122b Wehrli = 63B 
Schütrumpf), to the effect that he wished to explain how the sense-organs 
receive impressions from outside:  
The perceptions of the particular senses are due to the symmetry of the pores, when 
the appropriate emanations from a given object fits into the pores of each of the sense-
organs. (my own translation) 
                                                                                                                                           
Pontus), in his Introduction to Music, and he is quoting Xenocrates as relaying the doctrine 
of Pythagoras – certainly a creative adaptation of Pythagoras on his part! 
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This is confirmed by a testimony from Clement of Alexandria (Protr., V, 66, 4 
= Fr. 123 Wehrli = 64 Schütrumpf) which suggests that Heraclides effectively 
adopted the atomist theory of a stream of ‘images’ (eidola) emanating from 
objects and impressing themselves upon the sense-organs. All this seems not 
too far removed from Xenocrates’ theory about the way that the sense of 
hearing processes sound-atoms.  
In respect of the other members of the Old Academy, such as Polemon, 
Crantor, or Eudoxus of Cnidos, we know nothing of their views on sense-
perception. We may, however, adduce in this connection a passage from the 
ultimately Antiochian survey of Academic philosophy set out by Varro in 
Cicero’s Academica, I, 31-32, where a theory of sense-perception is presented: 
All the senses, on the other hand (scil. as opposed to intelligible reality), they consider to 
be dull and sluggish, nor are they at all capable of perceiving any of the things which are 
supposed to come within the scope of the senses, because they are either so small as to be 
imperceptible by sense,10 or subject to such violent motion that no single thing is ever 
stationary, nor even remains the same thing, because all things are in continual ebb and 
flow;11 accordingly, this whole level of reality they call ‘opinable’ (opinabilis = doxaste). 
Knowledge (scientia = episteme), on the other hand, they consider to exist nowhere 
except in the notions and reasonings of the mind (transl. Rackham, slightly modified). 
This must be regarded as a rather discouraging account of Old Academic 
theory, if one is disposed to argue, as I am, that a more positive evaluation 
of the sensible world, and our ability to cognize it, had been developing in 
the Academy of Speusippus and Xenocrates. However, we may reflect that, 
notwithstanding such theories about sense-perception as we have discerned 
on the part of these two thinkers, and of Heraclides, when it came to giving 
an overall assessment of the relation of the sense-world to the intelligible 
world, it is reasonable to suppose that one would tend to re-state the basic 
Platonic doctrine of the inferiority of the former. This need not preclude 
the development of theories as to the precise mode in which the senses 
relate to the data of the sense-world by utilising logos to discern harmonies 
and proportions derivable from the intelligible realm; it is simply 
concerned to reiterate the fundamental superiority and accuracy of the 
intellection of that realm. 
                                                            
10 This only makes sense if what are being referred to are the basic molecules of 
matter out of which sensible objects are composed; but if so, Varro is hardly making 
himself clear. 
11 Here we have a thoroughly ‘Heraclitean’ picture of the physical world, based on 
the description of sense-perception given in Theaet., 155d-157c. 
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